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RETHINKING U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS AFfER THE 
COLD WAR: CREATIVE AMBIGUITY VS. 
ASSERTIVE DEMOCRATIZATION 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
University of Richmond 
How should the U.S. deal with Taiwan in the post-Cold 
War era?1 Can the U.S. develop further relations with Taiwan 
based on Taiwan's (increasing) intrinsic values? Or will Tai-
wan remain just a factor - a negative one - in the broader 
China policy of the U.S.? Will the so-called "one China" pol-
icy, which allegedly has served U.S. national interests well 
since 1979, continue to serve the best U.S. interests? Or will a 
new policy reflecting present realities be called for? If that is 
the case, what should this new policy be? More fundamen-
tally, what impact, if any, does the end of the Cold War have 
on U.S.-Taiwan relations? 
This paper seeks to explore whether it is possible for the 
U.S. to pursue parallel relationships with Taiwan and China, 
that is, whether U.S.-Taiwan relations can be "decoupled" 
from the Washington-Taipei-Beijing triangle. It will first pro-
vide a brief overview on how the U.S.-Taiwan relations have 
evolved since 1949, when the reality of two Chinas set in with 
the founding of the People's Republic. Then it will discuss the 
framework of current U.S. policy toward Taiwan. In light of 
1 In this paper, "Taiwan" refers to the Republic of China (R.O.C.), and 
"China" refers to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). 
152 
significant developments within each country involved in 
recent years, this paper will question the policy's continued 
validity. To test how far the argument can go for strengthen-
ing U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relations, unaffected by U.S.-China 
relations, this paper will evaluate Taiwan's importance - on 
the world stage and to the United States; in other words, 
whether Taiwan is important enough to the U.S. as a "vital 
interest." Presumably adjusting or discarding the current 
"one China" policy can only be justified if Taiwan is a vital 
U.S. interest, worthy of risking China's ire. Finally, this paper 
will examine the determinants of U.S. policy toward Taiwan in 
the post-Cold War era, and speculate on several scenarios for 
the shape and direction of future U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
The Taiwan Issue: A Cold· War Legacy 
The end of the Cold War helped to heal many old wounds, 
such as the division of Germany, and the Israel-Arab conflict.2 
But one glaring exception is Taiwan. A nation of 21 million 
people and an economic powerhouse, Taiwan is excluded from 
the United Nations (U.N.) system, and is recognized by only 
31 (mostly small and unimportant) states.3 
The incongruence between Taiwan's growing economic 
might and its diminutive diplomatic status is an infamous leg-
acy of the Cold War. The precipitous and steady decline in 
Taiwan's international status was caused by Taiwan's expulsion 
from the U.N. in 1971 (to make room for China), President 
Nixon's trip to China that normalization relations in 1972, the 
derecognition by major countries including Japan and the U.S., 
2 However, some old wounds flared up that had been subordinated under 
the over-arching East-West conflict, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans 
3 The U.N. espouses universality. There are currently 185 member states. 
Nearly all territories on the earth are represented in this body. Most of those 
states that are not U.N. members voluntarily stay out the U.N. (e.g., Switzerland 
due to its permanent neutrality, and Thvalu due to economic reasons). That 
leaves Taiwan as the only state involuntarily excluded. 
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China's growing importance in world affairs and its unyielding 
stance on sovereignty. As a result, Taiwan, which used to be 
widely accepted as a sovereign state (a founding member of 
the U.N.), mysteriously came to be seen as neither sovereign 
nor a state. "What did Taiwan do or what happened in Taiwan 
so that suddenly it did not have the sovereignty it once had?", 
mused Gary L. Ackerman, the chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Asia and the Pacific of the House of Representatives.4 This 
result is theoretically unexpected in international law, because 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States stipulates that "the political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states" (Article 3) and 
"recognition is unconditional and irrevocable" (Article 6).5 
This gap - between what ought to be and what is - must be 
explained by the policies pursued by the major powers, includ-
ing the U.S., during the Cold War. 
The U.S. policy toward Taiwan during the Cold War had 
operated largely under a "one China" framework - that is, at 
any given time the U.S. maintained formal diplomatic ties with 
only one Chinese government, and recognized it as the sole 
legitimate government of all China. As it tuned out, the 
Nationalist government on Taiwan (R.O.C.) was a major bene-
ficiary of the "hot" Cold War. The U.S. recognized it until 
1978. But starting with detente, and with President Carter's 
decision to shift diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing 
in 1979, Taiwan became a major victim of detente, whereas the 
Communist government on the mainland (P.R.C.) enjoyed 
that exclusive recognition. 
4 U.S. House of Representatives, Should Taiwan be Admitted to the United 
Nations? (Joint Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Security, 
International Organizations, and human Right, and Asia and the Pacific Affairs), 
103rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1994), p. 35. 
5 The text of the Convention can be found in Burns H. Weston, Richard 
A. Falk, and Anthony A. D' Amato, eds., Basic Documents in International Law 
and Order (St. Paul, MN: West, 1980). 
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But U.S. choice of which China was "legitimate" during a 
given period of the Cold War era was also influenced by a stra-
tegic triangle involving the two Superpowers (the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union) and China. The following spatial models seek 
to help conceptualize the changing dynamics of U.S.-Taiwan 
relations in light of the changing strategic triangle.6 In these 
models, a solid line ( ) denotes a formal relationship 
with or without an explicit military alliance, whereas a dotted 
line ( .......... ) denotes an informal relationship with or 
without an implicit or de facto military alliance. We can divide 
the history of U.S.-Taiwan relations from 1949 until the pres-
ent into six periods (Figures 1-6). The shifts from one period 
to the next have been caused by important international or 
domestic developments, as I will discuss them in turn. 
Evolution of U.S.-Taiwan Relations: A Spatial Analysis 
1. 1949-1950. The first period lasted from the Truman 
Administration's issuance of the so-called White Papers7 in 
August 1949 (roughly the same time the Nationalist govern-
ment moved from the mainland to Taiwan) to the outbreak of 
the Korean War in June 1950. This period was characterized 
by the Truman Administration's intention to "wait until the 
dust settled" on the final outcome of the Chinese civil war. 
The Truman Administration ended its support of President 
Chiang Kai-shek's beleaguered government on Taiwan. It 
even anticipated an imminent military takeover of Taiwan by 
the Communists. Meanwhile, however, Mao Zedong's 
announcement upon the founding of the P.R.C. in October 
1949 to "lean to one side" (Soviet side) and a series of "missed 
6 For an excellent discussion on the changing dynamics of the strategic 
triangle, see Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: 
Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990). 
7 The United States Department of State, The White Papers, August 1949 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). 
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1949-1950: White Papers-Korean War 1978-1987 (Visits) 
2. ~ 5. ~ ~ 8 -~8 c oc 
1950-1969 (Sino-Soviet Split) 1987-1995? 
3. ~ 6. 8 8 e/ 
1972 (Shanghai Communique)- 1978 Nonnalization 1995-
opportunities" precluded the possibility of U.S.-China cooper-
ation. The spatial model for this period is denoted by a solid 
line between China and the Soviet Union, and no line between 
the U.S. and Taiwan. The locations of these countries indicate 
which of the two rival camps they belong to - the U.S. or the 
Soviet Union. 
2. 1950-1969. The outbreak of the Korean War changed 
U.S. assessment of the security situation in East Asia, and 
caused a dramatic reversal of its hands-off policy toward Tai-
wan. The Truman Administration dispatched the Seventh 
Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. Although this prevented Commu-
nist attack on Taiwan (and Nationalist attack on China), it also 
arguably reinserted the U.S. into the unfinished Chinese civil 
war. China's entry into the war on behalf of North Korea8 put 
China and the U.S. directly at war with each other. It finally 
convinced the Truman Administration that the Chinese Com-
8 See Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the 
Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 
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munists were dangerous proteges of the Soviet-led expansion-
ist International Communism, which intended to enslave the 
free world. Following the containment policy designed by 
George F. Kennan,9 the U.S. now regarded Taiwan as a vital 
link in the U.S. defense line, whose loss to Communist forces 
would imperil the U.S. position in Japan and the Philippines.10 
In 1954, the Eisenhower Administration signed a mutual 
defense treaty with Taiwan as part of its efforts to complete 
the "frontiers" along the Sino-Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, the 
alliance between the Soviet Union and China continued 
throughout the 1950s. This period is denoted by two separate 
solid lines between the Soviet Union and China, and between 
the U.S. and Taiwan, respectively - a testimony to the hard-
ening of East-West lines. 
However, gradually a rift started to develop between the 
Soviet Union and China. But the signs of a split between these 
two communist powers did not become unmistakable to the 
Nixon Administration until 1969, when the two Communist 
giants fought a border war. The Sino-Soviet split heralded a 
major global strategic realignment. Nixon and his realpolitik 
aide, Henry Kissinger, aware of the declining U.S. power, 
sought to use China as a strategic counterweight against 
Moscow. 
3. 1972-1978. The third period was marked by detente.U 
Nixon made a historic trip to China in 1972, and signed the 
Shanghai Communique, which would become the basis of U.S. 
9 George F. Kennan ["X"], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 25 (July 1947), pp. 566-582, and American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 
(New York: New American Library, 1951). See also John Lewis Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 2. 
10 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1978), p. 9. 
11 Nixon actually pursued two sets of detente: one between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, and the other between the U.S. and China. See John Spanier 
and Steven W. Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World War 11, 13th ed. 
(Washington, DC; CQ Press, 1995)~ chap. 7. 
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China policy for the next two decades (to be discussed 
below).12 The U.S. essentially forged a de facto anti-Soviet 
entente with China. Both sides concurred upon several 
regional issues (e.g., the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and 
Southwestern Asia), and were able to set aside the so-called 
Taiwan issue; However, as conditions for normalizing rela-
tions with Beijing, the U.S. eventually ceded to the three Chi-
nese demands: U.S. severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
abrogation of the U.S.-R.O.C. mutual defense treaty, and 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. On December 15, 
1978, the Carter Administration established diplomatic rela-
tions with the P.R.C., and severed formal ties with Taiwan. 
Therefore, this period saw the solid line between the Soviet 
Union and China disappear, and a dotted line develop 
between the U.S. and China, whereas the U.S. still maintained 
formal ties with Taiwan. After 1979 the two lines the U.S. 
maintained with China and Taiwan switched places: solid for 
China and dotted for Taiwan. 
4. 1979-1987. Since 1979, U.S. China policy has operated 
under an unusual, and often uneasy, dual-track framework: 
U.S. relations with the P.R.C. were handled diplomatically 
(based on the three communiques between Washington and 
Beijing),13 whereas U.S. relations with Taiwan were handled 
domestically (through the Taiwan Relations Act, TRA).14 The 
12 For a discussion on the evolution of U.S.-China relations since 1972, see 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992). 
13 They are the Shanghai Communique (February 27, 1972), Joint 
Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (January 1, 1979), 
and the August 17, 1982 Communique on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The texts 
can be found in Harding, A Fragile Relationship, Appendices B, C, and D, pp. 
373-390. 
14 U.S. Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, AprillO, 1979. The text of the Act 
can be found in Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, eds., Legislative History of 
the Taiwan Relations Act: An Analytic Compilation with Documents on 
Subsequent Developments (Jamaica, NY: American Association for Chinese 
Studies, 1982), pp. 288-95. As Stephen Solarz, the influential former Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of 
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TRA strove to continue U.S. substantive relations with Taiwan 
in the absence of diplomatic relations. It also sought to render 
an untested commitment to Taiwan's security by providing Tai-
wan with defensive weapons and by insisting upon peaceful 
settlement of Taiwan's future (see below). Meanwhile, the 
U.S. government sought to commit the P.R.C. to peaceful res-
olution of the Taiwan issue. China thus started its peace over-
tures wooing Taiwan, most exemplary of which was Deng 
Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" scheme. But by and 
large there was still very little contact between Taiwan and 
China. 
5. 1987-1995. This situation began to change, primarily due 
to the rapid democratization within Taiwan. In fact, in the two 
most recent periods, rapid domestic changes within Taiwan 
and between Taiwan and China have increasingly stretched the 
continued validity of U.S. China policy as envisioned in the 
Shanghai Communique (to be discussed below). In 1987, Pres-
ident Chiang Ching-kuo ended Martial Law, lifted the bans on 
registration of newspapers and political parties, and allowed 
Taiwan citizens to visit their relatives on the mainland.15 Trade 
and investments intensified. Presently the accumulated 
Taiwanese investment in China is estimated at $25 billion, 
Representatives, pointed out, the TRA was enacted to solve "an unprecedented 
diplomatic problem": how to continue U.S. substantive relations with the people 
on Taiwan even though the U.S. government terminated diplomatic relations 
with the government in Taipei, as a precondition for normalization of relations 
with Beijing. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittees on 
Human Rights and International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, Hearing and Markup, May 7, Jupe 
25, and August 1, 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1987), p. 1. 
15 Over time, this pretext of "family reunion" became less and less 
important. Today, with the exceptions of certain high-ranking officials in the 
government, military, and ruling party, anyone can go to China for whatever 
reasons they care to offer. For an account on how increased people-to-people 
interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the so-called "track-two 
diplomacy," have eased tension, see Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the 
Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1993). 
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powering China's export boom. Last year, Taiwan became the 
third largest foreign investor in China, investing $5.4 billion 
alone.16 Lee Teng-hui, the first native Taiwanese to become 
R.O.C. President, succeeded Chiang and accelerated democra-
tization. The 1947 Constitution was amended; all parliamen-
tarians were elected in Taiwan; all the major executive heads, 
including the president of the R.O.C., the governor of the Tai-
wan Province, and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, have 
been directly elected by people. Accompanying the breathtak-
ing democratization was a more assertive foreign policy 
approach, known as "pragmatic diplomacy" or "substantive 
diplomacy," and a more confident dealing with China. 
Replacing the old "three-nos" policy is the new attempts to 
institutionalize cross-Strait (equal) negotiations, hopefully 
leading to some type of modus vivendiP This intra-China rap-
prochement is represented by a new dotted line between Tai-
wan and China. Taipei's approach is functionalist in nature: to 
accumulate experience and trust on "practical" and "periph-
eral" matters (e.g., fishing disputes, document verification, 
crime prevention) that can be used in the eventual "core" 
negotiations (political talk regarding future status of Taiwan). 
China, however, seems more interested in immediate political 
talk that will lead to reunification. This modus vivendi lasted 
until 1995, when President Bill Clinton, facing overwhelming 
congressional support for Lee, approved President Lee Teng-
hui's visit. 
6. 1995-. China reacted furiously to Lee's trip to his alma 
mater, Cornell University. China recalled its ambassador to 
Washington, jailed the American-Chinese human right activist, 
Harry Wu, cancelled all talks with Taiwan, and launched war 
16 Far Eastern Economic Review, October 12, 1995, p. 55. 
17 In 1992 this arrangement was established, wherein both sides set up 
"private" organizations (Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation and China's 
Associations for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) to conduct the actual 
dealings in accordance with instructions from respective government agencies 
(Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council under the Cabinet and China's Taiwan 
Affairs Office under the State Council). 
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games to intimidate Taiwan. Both China-U.S. and China-Tai-
wan relations turned tense. Taiwan's first direct presidential 
election, just completed in March 1996, not only marked the 
completion of Taiwan's democratization,18 but also institution-
alized Taiwan's de facto, if not de jure, independence.19 Mean-
while, buoyed by popular support for joining the U.N. 
(differences on names notwithstanding) Taiwan began a vigor-
ous campaign to enter the U.N. in 1993. So Taiwan's democ-
ratization and a search for greater international recognition go 
hand in hand.20 Lee, who received 54 percent of the votes in 
the four-way presidential race, certainly has the mandate to 
start political negotiations with China. Therefore, it is reason-
able to argue that in the future, as a result of Taiwan's democ-
ratization, Taiwan will seek to institutionalize, if not formalize, 
its relations with the U.S. and China, respectively. This is 
denoted by the hoped solid lines between Taiwan and the U.S. 
and between Taiwan and China. If that day should come, any 
dyad in this triangular relationship will be considered an inter-
state relationship. Such scenario will seriously undermine the 
continued validity of the current U.S. "one China" policy. I 
will discuss this possibility in more details. But first I will lay 
out the basic framework of the current U.S. policy toward Tai-
18 According to Samuel P. Huntington's criteria of contestation and 
participation, Taiwan's 1996 presidential election qualifies as the inauguration of 
democracy in Taiwan. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13, 275. 
19 As Parris H. Chang, a DPP legislator defiantly said, "Sichuan and 
Guangdong (China's two largest provinces) don't elect a President, but Taiwan is 
going to do so, and that means that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign entity ... 
The fact that we are going to the polls and can vote for a President means we are 
casting a vote for independence." New York Times, August 29, 1995, p. AS. 
20 Gaining greater international recognition helps alleviate not just the 
frustration felt by Taiwan people about their country's diplomatic status. The 
"internationalization" of the Taiwan issue (as opposed to China's "internal 
affairs") also has important security implications for Taiwan, see Vincent Wei-
cheng Wang, "Does Democratization Enhance or Reduc;:e Taiwan's Security? A 
Democratic-Peace Inquiry," Asian Affairs 23(1)(Spring 1996, pp. 3-19). 
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wan, and explain why the assumptions on which this frame-
work was based may no longer be valid. 
The Increasingly Unbalanced U.S. "Dual Track" 
Policy Framework 
U.S policy toward Taiwan since 1972 has been guided by a 
so-called "basic framework" that consists of one domestic law 
(The Taiwan Relations Act) and three communiques (1972, 
1978, and 1982). This basic framework has sought to maintain 
a balanced "dual track" policy toward China and Taiwan. It 
includes three interlocking principles: (1) compliance to a "one 
China" policy acknowledging China's position that Taiwan is a 
part of China, (2) pragmatic development of relations with the 
PRC (diplomatically) and Taiwan (informally but cordially), 
and (3) commitment to the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
issue by the Chinese themselves. The following statement 
made by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs), succinctly summarized this dual 
track approach: "While we recognize the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China, we also maintain a vigorous and expanding unofficial 
relationship with Taiwan, within the framework established by 
the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques with the 
P.R.C."21 
This dual track policy contains elements of both creativity 
and ambiguity. Although this "creative ambiguity" has 
offered U.S. policy makers much flexibility, it also perpetuates 
some basic policy dilemmas. For example, the 1972 Shanghai 
Communique states: "The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one 
21 "U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific," statement before the 
Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House International Relations 
Committee, 9 February 1995, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, voi. 6, no. 9 
(February 27, 1995), p. 145. 
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China and that Taiwan is a part of China . . . It reaffirms its 
interest in peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves." On the one hand, this clever "diplo-
matic lie" allowed the U.S. and the P.R.C. to set aside ("agree 
to disagree") their differences on the Taiwan issue in order to 
forge cooperation on other issues. On the other hand, it 
arguably retained the U.S. interest on the future of Taiwan by 
the insistence on peaceful settlement. 
Not infrequently these two sets of goals have seemed 
mutually contradictory. For example, the August 17, 1982 
Communique states: "The United States Government . . . 
intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading 
over a period of time to a final resolution." While the P.R.C. 
understood this to mean that the U.S. would gradually reduce, 
and eventually stop, arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. insisted 
that reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would be predicated 
upon the Chinese "fundamental policy" to strive for a peaceful 
solution to the Taiwan question. 
When it comes to U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security, 
the U.S. policy is also ambiguous yet flexible. For example, 
Section 2 of the Taiwan Relations Act states that it is the pol-
icy of the U.S. to "consider any effort to determine the future 
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts 
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the West-
ern Pacific and of grave concern to the U.S." However, the 
U.S. commitment stops short of a carte blanche to Taiwan. 
The same section only calls for the U.S. "to maintain the 
capacity . .. to resist any resort to force or other forms of coer-
cion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or eco-
nomic system, of the people on Taiwan." For years this 
declaration has kept both Beijing and Taiwan wondering if the 
U.S. would militarily intervene at all in the event of a P.R.C. 
attack against Taiwan. Part of the suspense was cleared by the 
Clinton Administration's decision to dispatch two aircraft car-
rier battle groups to the Taiwan waters in March 1996 in 
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response to the P.R.C.'s military intimidation against Taiwan 
before the island's first direct popular presidential elections. 
In sum, this policy essentially has postponed a fundamental 
and tough policy choice between the P.R.C. and Taiwan. It 
arguably has achieved some success. Those who were involved 
in the policy-making itself like to claim credit for a policy that 
they claim has allowed the U.S. to establish diplomatic ties 
with an important country on the world stage, and at the same 
time safeguarded the security of a U.S. traditional ally.22 
However, the balance between the two tracks, U.S.-P.R.C. 
and U.S.-Taiwan relations, which this policy has so painstak-
ingly tried to maintain, as one writer puts, "is becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain, or even to define with a high 
degree of consensus." As a result, "the modalities of U.S. pol-
icy toward Taiwan are becoming outdated and dysfunctional in 
some instances."23 
The sources for this growing incongruity have to do with 
developments within Taiwan, China, and the U.S. New devel-
opments in Taiwan are especially important. 
22 For example, Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a congressional hearing, self-congratulated that 
"This 'one China' policy has worked exceptionally well, and has enabled the U.S. 
to achieve progress toward all of U.S. objectives." He listed these objectives as 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area, constructive engagement with 
China, continuation of strong economic and cultural relations with the people of 
Taiwan, and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves, 
which he argued all the six administrations since 1972 have shared. H. Con. Res. 
63, Relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan's) Participation in the United 
Nations, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 104th Congress, 1st session, August 3, 1995 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 29-35, 66-71. 
23 Martin L. Lasater, The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the 
Security of Taiwan (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 12. 
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Factors Shaping a New U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan 
Four sets of factors provide the sources for significant or 
even fundamental adjustments of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. 
The first set is developments in Taiwan. Three factors are 
especially relevant: democratization, greater international rec-
ognition, and institutionalized cross-strait ties. Democratiza~ 
tion has created a separate identity for Taiwan. It also shows 
that a consensus on Taiwan's future does not yet exist among' 
the people of Taiwan themselves. Such consensus may, or may 
not, support unification with the mainland. In practice, the, 
notion of self-determination for Taiwan can manifest itself at 
three levels: (1) direct and popular election of top leaders, (2) 
plebiscite, and (3) a formal declaration of independence. The 
first expression was realized in the March 1996 presidential 
elections. The results from this election mean that a majority 
of Taiwanese voters reject China's sovereignty claim.24 They 
also mean that Lee Teng-hui has the mandate to set the stage 
for the second and third expressions, or accommodation with 
China. The assertion in the Shanghai Communique that the 
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait think that there is 
only one China, of which Taiwan is part, is increasingly doubt-
ful. Indeed, in 1991 President Lee abrogated the so-called 
Temporary Provisions (During the Period of Mobilization and 
Suppression of Rebellion), thereby effectively treating the 
PRC as a government (political entity) of China. This move 
was a tacit yet unambiguous abandonment of the "one-China" 
policy. Further, what if Chinese on one side of the Taiwan 
Strait (i.e., the people on Taiwan), through free choice, declare 
de jure independence? Should the U.S. accept this democraHc 
24 In a four-way race, the pro-status quo incumbent, Lee Teng-hui, got 54 
percent of the votes; the pro-independence Peng Ming-Min 21 percent, the 
allegedly pro-unification Lin Yang-kang 15 percent, and Chen Li-an 10 percent. 
China took solace in that the two pro-unification candidates combined to get 
more votes than the pro-independence Peng (25 percent vs. 21 percent). But 
actually anti-China votes amounted to 75 percent, including Lee's. China's 
saber-rattling clearly backfired. New York Times, March 24, 1996, pp. 1, 4, 14. 
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result and change its policy toward Taiwan accordingly? Or 
should it continue to cling on a "one China" policy that 
seemed diplomatically expedient for the U.S.? 
Democratization also leads to a call for greater interna-
tional recognition, which has the effect of internationalizing 
the Taiwan issue. If the Taiwan issue is really a domestic issue, 
as China has always claimed, then the principle of non-inter-
ference in internal affairs would preclude any third country, 
including the U.S., to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a 
P.R. C. attack. However, if the Taiwan issue is an international 
one, then the principles of self-determination, humanitarian 
intervention, and other U.N. actions apply.25 In this context, it 
is easy to understand why the people of Taiwan want a seat in 
the U.N. It is a natural extension of their democratization pro-
cess and it also has important security ramifications. The U.S. 
actions in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 suggest that Taiwan's 
future is far from being China's internal affairs alone. 
Furthermore, increasing contacts between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait can also be a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, such developments may seem preparatory steps for 
political unification, as China understandably hope. Yet, on 
the other hand, the increasing institutionalization of bilateral 
exchange also highlights the coexistence of two Chinese 
entities. 
In sum, rapid developments in Taiwan are making many of 
the basic premises and continued pertinence of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan obsolete. In addition, there are good reasons 
to argue that the U.S. has important interests in this new pros-
perous and democratic Taiwan.26 
25 For a discussion of the legal implications of a P.R.C. aggression against 
Taiwan, see David J. Scheffer, "International Legal Implications of a PRC Use of 
Military Force Against Taiwan," in ParrisH, Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., 
If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (University Press 
of America for the Center for East Asian Studies, Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1993), pp. 55-64. 
26 See Martin L. Lasater, U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan (Boulder: 
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The second set of factors relate to developments within the 
P.R.C. Two factors are important. The first is leadership 
change. Although it seems certain that no potential future 
Chinese leader jockeying to succeed Deng Xiaoping can afford 
appear "soft" on fundamental issues involving sovereignty, the 
final outcome of the succession crisis remains uncertain. The 
future leader(s) that eventually emerge(s) may deviate from 
China's current position regarding Taiwan. Chinese policy. 
may move toward either a more hawkish stance or a more· 
dovish one, both of which would require a reassessment of 
U.S. policy. 
The other factor is whether China can handle Hong Kong's 
reversion well and maintain its prosperity. China's success on 
the Hong Kong issue will no doubt add to the credibility of its 
commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement, which can 
then persuade the U.S. to lessen its involvement in the Taiwan 
issue. 
The third set of factors originate from developments within 
the U.S. These include a changing party control of Congress 
(the Republican victory of 1994), the changing (worsening) 
public perception of China, and election-year politics. But 
most importantly the old consensus on China seems to have 
fallen apart. 
Three schools on how the U.S. should deal with China have 
emerged since the end of the Cold War: engagement, confron-
tation, and destabilizationP Although the engagement 
school, which includes the Clinton Administration, is in the 
majority, there is no irrefutable evidence that this strategy has 
worked. The end of the Cold War has eroded China's strategic 
importance as a anti-Soviet counterweight. Meanwhile, China 
Westview, 1993), and "U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan," Orbis, vol. 37, no. 2 
(Spring 1993), pp. 239-253. 
27 David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" 
Current History, vol. 94, no. 593 (September 1995), pp. 241-47; Kenneth 
Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 6 (November/ 
December 1995), pp. 35-49; Time, July 30, 1995; Economist, July 29, 1995. 
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and the U.S. have clashed over a range of issues: human rights, 
Taiwan, Harry Wu, nuclear testing, weapon proliferation, trade 
disputes, South China Sea, etc. China policy, which disap-
peared from presidential debates since 1972, may become a 
hotly debated issue in 1996. This is especially true, given the 
increasing pro-Taiwan voices in Congress, Congress' opposi-
tion to the China policy of the White House and the State 
Department, and hence the growing assertiveness of Congress 
on China policy.28 
In sum, the existing U.S. policy toward Taiwan is being 
seriously challenged by new developments occurring in the 
main players involved. However, unlike 1972 when Taiwan 
was poor, authoritarian and dependent on the U.S., and hence 
had to accept the fait accompli of U.S.-China geopolitical 
realignment, today Taiwan, affluent, democratic, and impatient 
with its second-class international status, is the main catalyst of 
change. But how far can Taiwan's growing important necessi-
tate a fundamental shift in U.S. policy? 
Intrinsic Value vs. Perceived Importance 
A good argument can be made that if Taiwan has over-
whelming intrinsic value to the U.S. that qualifies as a vital 
U.S. interest, then perhaps the U.S. can pursue a totally 
independent relationship with Taiwan, without regard to 
China's rancor. Presumably the gain from a vital Taiwan will 
outweigh an unimportant China. If, however, despite Taiwan's 
growing stature, it does not constitute a vital U.S. interest, or if 
Taiwan is not as important to the U.S. as China, then an 
independent policy toward Taiwan will be less likely; and U.S. 
policy toward Taiwan will more likely remain only a factor in 
28 The most dramatic example of the gap between Congress and the 
executive branch was the overwhelming congressional support (396 to 0 in the 
House and 97 to 1 in the Senate) for Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University, 
which forced the White House to reverse its previous policy. 
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U.S. policy toward China, and be subordinated under that lat-
ter relationship - no matter how distasteful it may be for 
Taipei. There are two ways to probe the answers to this ques-
tion: Taiwan's importance on the world stage and to the U.S., 
and how American public and leaders perceive Taiwan. 
On the first criterion, Taiwan can be seen as a "middle 
power," holding important commercial shipping lanes. It also 
bodes well with the leading trends in the post-Cold War era. 
Many scholars have argued that the broad trends in the post-
Cold War "New World Order" (or Disorder )29 are economic 
development and political democratization. The former refers 
to neoliberal reform: the draconian task by many countries 
burdened by excessive intervention by the state (i.e., the com-
mand economies of Eastern Europe, and many Latin Ameri-
can countries with long legacy of import-substituting 
industrialization) to shed state intervention, install an efficient 
market, control inflation, cut government budget deficits, and 
promote growth.3° The latter refers to the remarkable world-
wide Third Wave of democratization in many formerly author-
29 The phrase "new world order" was first popularized by former U.S. 
President George Bush during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) surrounding the invasion 
of Kuwait by Iraq and the global reaction to that invasion. The qualifier 
"disorder" reflects an opposite view: the world will be chaotic, disorderly, and 
unstable, rather than orderly. 
30 The works are numerous. The most systematic theoretical and 
comparative study of the politics of economic reform include Stephan Haggard 
and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment: 
International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Marfa 
Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A 
Social-Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
Joan Nelson et al., Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), Joan 
Nelson, ed., A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Market Reform in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Vols. I and II, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1994), Joan 
Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the 
Third World (Princeton University Press, 1990), and Joan Nelson, ed., Fragile 
Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick: Transaction, 
1989). 
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itarian countries.31 Both trends seemed to conform to the 
Western political and economic liberalism that Fukuyama pro-
claimed: that mankind has come "not to an 'end of ideology' 
or a convergence between capitalism and socialism ... but to 
an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. 
The triumph of the ... Western idea is evident. .. in the total 
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western 
liberalism. "32 
Accounts of Taiwan's economic success abound. It is truly 
a miraculous story of "rags to riches." The result is that today 
Taiwan is a significant economic power:33 it produces the 
world's twentieth largest gross national product (GNP)($244 
billion); its personal income level (measured in GNP per cap-
ita) is the 25th highest in the world ($11,604); it is the world's 
fourteenth largest trading nation (with exports and imports 
over $178 billion); its foreign exchange reserves, nearing $100 
billion, trails only that of Japan; it is the seventh largest inves-
tor in the world and second only to Japan in Asia. 
Taiwan is also important to the U.S. economically. Taiwan 
is the fifth largest trading partner of the U.S. - the U.S. is the 
largest export market for Taiwan, and the second import 
source. In fact, Taiwan is the second largest U.S. export mar-
31 See Huntington, The Third Wave; Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave 
of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and 
Research," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1994), pp. 135-170, Guillermo 
O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), and Tatu Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization: A Comparative 
Study of 147 States, 1980-1988 (New York: Crane, Russak, 1990). 
32 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest 
(Summer 1989), p. 3. 
33 All of the following statistics are 1994 figures, unless noted otherwise. 
The sources for these numbers include Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1995 
(Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1995); Far Eastern Economic 
Review, October 12, 1995 and November 10, 1995; U.S. House, Should Taiwan be 
Admitted, Winston Lord, "U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific;" and 
Ray S. Cline, The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America for the U.S. Global Strategic 
Council, 1994). 
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ket in Asia, and also the only East Asian trading partner to 
reduce its trade surplus vis-a-vis the U.S. From 1952 to 1994, 
approved U.S. private investment in Taiwan amounted to 
1,045 cases and $4.6 billion - about 22 percent of all cases, 
and 28 percent of total amount of direct foreign investment in 
Taiwan. U.S. companies played a very important role in that 
island nation's successful export-led industrialization. So the 
economic importance of Taiwan to the U.S., and in the world, 
is indisputable. 
The cultural and scientific importance of Taiwan to the 
U.S. is also quite significant. Students from Taiwan make upi 
the third largest foreign student group in the U.S. (largest until 
late 1980s). Many elites in the government, business, and edu-
cational establishments have studied in the U.S. For instance, 
nearly half of the cabinet members have Ph.D.s from Ameri-
can universities. Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park, the 
much heralded "Taiwan's Silicon Valley," recruited many top 
Taiwanese American scientists and engineers that have 
reached positions of prominence in American companies. 
Residents of Taiwan also filed the eighth largest number of 
patents in the U.S.34 
Using a formula to calculate countries' total perceived 
power, Cline estimated that Taiwan's perceived power ranks 
eleventh in the world.35 This confirms Taiwan as a middle 
power in the world. So an argument can be made that Taiwan, 
with important economic power and substantial military 
might, has considerable intrinsic value for the U.S. 
But how do the public and leaders perceive Taiwan's 
importance? The short answer is that, despite American pub-
lic's steadily improving views on Taiwan, Taiwan is not ve,ry 
important to the American public, and especially American 
leaders! 
34 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1994), p. 871. 
35 Next only to the U.S., Japan, Germany, Russia, Canada, China, Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Brazil. RayS. Cline, The Power of Nations, p. 107. 
Table 1. Perceptions of the U.S. Vital Interest 
1994 1990 1986 
The Public % The Leaders % The Public % The Leaders % The Public % The Leaders % 
Japan 85 Russia 98 Saudi Arabia 83 Japan 95 Great Britain 83 Japan 98 
Saudi Arabia 83 Mexico 98 U.S.S.R 83 Germany 95 Canada 78 Germany 98 
Russia 79 Japan 96 Japan 79 Mexico 94 Saudi Arabia 77 Canada 96 
Kuwait 76 China 95 Great Britain 79 U.S.S.R. 93 Japan 77 Mexico 96 
Mexico 76 Saudi Arabia 94 Kuwait 77 Canada 90 Germany 77 Great Britain 94 
Canada 71 Canada 93 Canada 77 Saudi Arabia 89 Israel 76 China 89 
Great Britain 69 Germany 91 Germany 73 Great Britain 86 Mexico 74 Saudi Arabia 88 
China 68 South Korea 90 Israel 67 Israel 78 Phillipines 60 Israel 86 
Cuba 67 Israel 86 Mexico 63 Egypt 76 Egypt 61 France 82 
Germany 66 Great Britain 82 Phillipines 62 China 73 China 60 Phillipines 81 
South Korea 65 Egypt 78 Iran 56 Kuwait 69 South Africa 58 South Korea 80 
Israel 64 Ukraine 66 Egypt 53 France 63 South Korea 58 South Africa 63 
South Africa 57 France 59 South Africa 53 Phillipines 51 France 56 Brazil 63 
Haiti 56 South Africa 52 El Salvador 50 Brazil 51 Taiwan 53 Taiwan 48 
Taiwan 49 Brazil 49 South Korea 49 South Africa 50 Brazil 44 
Egypt 45 Poland 46 China 47 Taiwan 47 Poland 35 
Bosnia 45 Baltic State 34 Taiwan 46 Nigeria 31 
France 39 Haiti 33 France 45 
Rwanda 35 Poland 43 
Ukraine 35 Turkey 41 
Brazil 35 Brazil 39 
India 31 Nigeria 29 
Poland 31 
Baltic State 29 
Note: Percentage of respondents that feel that the U.S. has a vital interest in that country 
Source: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1995, p.20; ibid, 1991, pp. 18-19 
"""" -....} 
"""" 
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Table 1 reports the countries that are considered "vital 
interests" to the U.S. (ranked by percentage of respondents 
that say the U.S. has a vital interest in that country), taken by 
the Gallup Poll for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
in 1994, 1990, and 1986.36 As we can see, although American 
public and leaders generally perceive Taiwan as important 
enough to designate it as a country where the U.S. has a vital 
interest, such importance is at most lukewarm. For example, 
Taiwan never made the top ten most vital countries to the U.S. 
Especially disturbing is the diminished importance leaders 
assign to Taiwan - in 1994 the leaders polled did not even 
think that Taiwan was as important as Haiti, or the Baltic 
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Another complicating factor is that China, whose reaction 
the U.S. must consider in dealing with Taiwan, apparently 
becomes more and more important in the eyes of the Ameri-
can public and leaders alike, especially among the leaders, who 
now rank China as the fourth most important country to the 
U.S. Indeed, 91 percent of the leaders and 66 percent of the 
public believe that China "will play a greater role in the next 
ten years than today:"37 Yet, at the same time, it seems that 
Americans are also concerned about China's growing power. 
The 1995 study reports that 57 percent of the public, and 46 
percent of the leaders view "the development of China as a 
world power" as a "critical threat" to the U.S. In fact, China is 
now the leaders' second most worrisome threat to U.S. inter-
ests (only after "the possibility of unfriendly countries becom-
ing nuclear powers"), and fifth for the public. In contrast, in 
1990 only 16 percent of the leaders and 40 percent of the pub-
lic viewed the rise of China's power as a critical threat to the 
u.s.3s 
36 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 1995 and ibid, 1991. 
37 American Public Opinion, 1995, pp. 25, 33. 
38 American Public Opinion; 1995, p. 21, and ibid, 1991, p. 20. 
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The study also uses a "thermometer rating" to gauge 
Americans' feelings toward foreign countries - warm feelings 
are greater than 50°, and cool feelings are lower than 50°. 
According to this scheme, American public's feeling toward 
Taiwan is largely neutral: 48° in 1994, the same as for Saudi 
Arabia and South Korea, and 48° in 1990, the same as for 
India. By contrast, China scored 45° in 1990, and 4T in 1994.39 
So it would seem that the American public is almost indiffer-
ent toward China and Taiwan. Apparently Taiwan's laudable 
progress in democratization has not caught on with the general 
American public. 
This lukewarm feeling is further reflected on the issue of 
whether the U.S. should send troops to defend Taiwan if China 
invades Taiwan. Except in the 1987 study, which shows the 
public's lukewarm approval of this scenario (the leaders 
opposed), this scenario did not even come up at all in the 1991 
and 1995 studies as a convincing case for sending U.S. troops 
abroad. A recent poll done by Harris and Associates, Inc. 
after China's military exercises off the Taiwanese waters in the 
summer of 1995 found that (1) 73 percent of those polled 
agree "China has no legitimate reason" to conduct missile tests 
in waters close to Taiwan, (2) nearly 70 percent of those polled 
regard Taiwan as a "completely separate and independent 
country," but (3) 71 percent answered no to the question "If 
China attempts to invade Taiwan, should the U.S. fight to 
defend Taiwan and resist China?" 
One word of caution of reading these poll results is in 
order. Poll results are ephemeral; sometimes dramatic events 
can quickly shift the balance. For example, the Chicago Coun-
cil polls discussed above would have led us to expect a non-
action on the part of the U.S. government in response to 
China's intimidation of Taiwan in March, 1996. Conceivably 
the general public probably now holds a more favorable view 
on Taiwan and a less favorable one on China. 
39 American Public Opinion, 1995, p. 22, and ibid, 1991, p. 21. 
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This lukewarm opinion about Taiwan can be interpreted as 
either a success or a failure: success in that the current China 
policy has managed the "Taiwan issue" well so it does not pro-
voke controversy and demand heightened attention; failure in 
that the U.S. leaders and public have fallen into a complacent 
zone of comfort. It not only casts serious doubt on U.S. secur-
ity commitment toward Taiwan in the event of a P.R.C. attack; 
but also imposes considerable obstacle on the efforts to 
develop U.S.-Taiwan relations - unimpeded by China and 
based strictly on Taiwan's intrinsic value. Taiwan's growing 
international stature and riding the global trends of economic 
development and political democratization should provide 
ingredients for building stronger U.S.-Taiwan relations sepa-
rate from U.S.-China relations. Due to the growing impor-
tance of China and the public's lukewarm views on Taiwan, the 
prospects for U.S.-Taiwan relations parallel to U.S.-China rela-
tions do not appear bright. What can cause a shift in the cur-
rent U.S. China policy? In the next section, I will explore 
some of these possibilities and speculate on the various scena-
rios that changes in U.S. policy can take. 
Conclusion: Policy Determinants and Various Scenarios 
Defining U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the post-Cold War 
era encounters mitigating factors. Some of these factors call 
for a U.S. policy toward Taiwan, that is, independent of and 
unrelated to U.S. China policy. Other factors suggest that the 
Taiwan issue will remain a factor in the U.S.-China relation-
ship. And the net effect is difficult to quantify. This suggests 
that the changing circumstances after the end of the Cold War 
necessitates some serious rethinking on this issue. Three 
broad scenarios can serve as models for U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan in the post-Cold War era. Each has differing degrees 
of advantages and disadvantages. 
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The first scenario is disengagement. This policy calls for the 
U.S. to accept the P.R.C. position on Taiwan and in fact pres-
sure Taiwan to start negotiation with the P.R.C. on reunifica-
tion (largely on Beijing's terms). The justification for this 
model is that China has emerged as a very important country 
with growing global weight in the post-Cold War era. The U.S. 
needs its cooperation on many issues, including non-prolifera-
tion, peace on the Korean Peninsula, environmental degrada-
tion, trade cooperation, etc. The U.S. cannot afford to take on 
this emerging giant on so many fronts, especially on an issue 
that touches China's most sensitive nerve on sovereignty. By 
supporting Taiwan, the U.S. risks a hostile and recalcitrant 
partner and a potential enemy. If China's track record on 
Hong Kong appears acceptable, this will lend even more sup-
port to a gradual U.S. disengagement. The main advantage of 
this approach, naturally, is that it can arguably get rid of the 
so-called Taiwan issue, which has hampered a true and com-
plete partnership between the U.S. and China, and, because 
China presumably will use peaceful means to achieve unifica-
tion, it fulfills U.S. insistence on peaceful settlement. The 
main disadvantages are two-fold: it calls into serious question 
among U.S. allies about U.S. credibility, and it may not be in 
the best self-interests of the U.S. 
Lasater correctly pointed out the pitfalls of moving away 
from a policy of supporting the process of peaceful resolution 
of the Taiwan issue to a policy of backing a specific outcome of 
that policy. 
(1) A consensus on Taiwan's future does not yet exist 
among the people of Taiwan themselves. Such a consensus 
may, or may not, support unification with the mainland. 
(2) Taipei has many motives in increasing contact with the 
mainland, not all of which are designed to achieve unifica-
tion. The U.S. should not assume unification in the near 
future is the preferred choice of the Taiwanese government. 
(3) For the U.S. to support reunification would weaken Tai-
wan's negotiation position with the mainland and thus may 
harm the interests of the Taiwanese people. 
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( 4) Beijing has not yet worked out the mechanisms for a 
successful integration of a capitalist economy with main-
land's socialist economy. The fate of Hong Kong after 1997 
should first be observed ... 
(5) The continuation of China's reform program and open 
policies after the death of Deng ... is not assured. The 
leadership succession ... should first be observed. 
(6) Adequate studies have not been made on the impact of 
China's reunification on U.S. interests. Such analysis is 
especially important in the post-Cold War period as the 
P.R.C. modernizes its armed forces and acquires power 
projection forces. 
(7) The status quo in the Taiwan Strait continues to serve 
U.S. interests admirably well. A change in U.S.-China-Tai-
wan policy should be undertaken with great caution.40 
The second scenario is de/inking. This policy calls for the 
U.S. to recognize Taiwan's intrinsic value and its value to the 
U.S. Based on these assessments, Taiwan deserves a separate 
relationship with the U.S. that is not subject to considerations 
of U.S.-China relations. This policy is based on the political 
realities in Taiwan, and prepares the U.S. to recognize Taiwan, 
if the people of Taiwan should decide, through democratic 
means (e.g., plebiscite), that they want separate statehood, 
official names notwithstanding. This policy not only frees the 
U.S. once for all in its dealing with Taiwari, but also is consis-
tent with the U.S. values of democracy and freedoms. The 
U.S. can then pursue its national interests in dealing with Tai-
wan, without endless concessions to the "bigger and more 
important" China. This is essentially a "two Chinas" or "one 
China, one Taiwan" policy. The biggest drawback is that it 
risks a very belligerent P.R.C. response, most likely the use of 
force against Taiwan. However, as the Clinton Administra-
tion's Taiwan policy review shows, no matter how small the 
improvements the U.S. makes in upgrading its relations with 
Taiwan, China will not be satisfied and is likely to react very 
negatively. So a sudden and decisive shift is more preferable 
40 Lasater, The Changing of the Guards, pp. 150-51. 
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than a protracted and constant rift. China just has to accept 
the U.S. decision. 
However, due to the predictable Chinese reaction, the U.S. 
should seriously consider this option when two conditions are 
in place: (1) the initiative comes from Taiwan, not from the 
U.S.: that is, only after the Taiwanese people and government 
have decided through democratic means for formal indepen-
dence and requested diplomatic recognition will the U.S. rec-
ognize the new country, and (2) there exists a good probability 
that once the U.S. takes the lead, the major countries will 
overcome their "collective action" problem regarding Tai-
wan.41 Some people in the U.S. think that this "creeping inde-
pendence" is a major destabilizer in U.S.-China-Taiwan 
relations, and should be discouraged so that the "tail" (the Tai-
wan issue) will not drag the "dog" (U.S.-China relations).42 
But this view is increasingly indefensible. Although the U.S. 
can legitimately dissuade Taipei not to provoke Beijing, the 
U.S. cannot deny the fundamental right of the Taiwanese peo-
ple and yet preach freedom and democracy at the same time. 
In fact, if the people in Taiwan vote to formally separate from 
China, which is through peaceful means, the U.S. will be hard 
pressed not to come to Taiwan's aid in that most likely event 
-a P.R.C. attack. Although the U.S. insists upon a peaceful 
solution reached by the Chinese themselves on the Taiwan 
issue, it should be understand that negotiation itself may not 
be neutral, because so far the P.R.C. has not shown any other 
proposal that is more appealing than Deng's "one country, two 
systems" scheme, which the Taiwanese people had long 
rejected. Meanwhile, to prepare Taiwan for the negotiation 
table, the U.S. should start empowering Taiwan internation-
ally. Only relative formal equality between Beijing and Taipei 
41 That is, accepting China's peculiar legal syllogism: (1) there is only one 
China, of which Taiwan is a part; (2) the P.R.C. is the sole legal government of 
China; (3) it then follows that Taiwan is a part of the P.R.C. 
42 See, for example, Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key is Better U.S. Relations 
with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). 
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icy can serve Washington, Taipei, and Beijing for another three 
to five years. In the meantime, much research and debate is 
needed on what to replace the "one China" paradigm. As one 
historian remarks, it is easier to announce the end of an era 
than to name the new era.44 This paper ventures to suggest 
that a delinking strategy should replace the "one China" status 
quo. After all, the Cold War is over for most in the world; it 
should also be over for the U.S. and Taiwan. 
44 James Atlas, "Name That Era: Pinpointing A Moment On the Map of 
History," New York Times, March 19, 1995, section 4, p. 1. 
